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Abstract
Recent research has repeatedly shown that machine learn-
ing techniques can be applied to either whole files or file
fragments to classify them for analysis. We build upon
these techniques to show that for samples of un-labeled
compiled computer object code, one can apply the same
type of analysis to classify important aspects of the code,
such as its target architecture and endianess. We show
that using simple byte-value histograms we retain enough
information about the opcodes within a sample to clas-
sify the target architecture with high accuracy, and then
discuss heuristic-based features that exploit information
within the operands to determine endianess. We introduce
a dataset with over 16000 code samples from 20 architec-
tures and experimentally show that by using our features,
classifiers can achieve very high accuracy with relatively
small sample sizes.
1 Motivation
Digital forensics remains largely a manual process re-
quiring detailed and time consuming analysis by experts
within the field. In particular, the analysis of computer
executables, either for forensic analysis, reverse engi-
neering, or malware detection, remains a time consum-
ing task as the level or expertise needed to understand
compiled object code is quite high. Additionally, the ex-
plosion of different types of devices (cell phones, com-
plex routers, smart sensors, the internet of things (IoT))
means that experts are no longer dealing with just one
computing architecture, but instead are seeing a myriad
of executable code (firmware, mobile apps, etc.) travers-
ing their networks and showing up in forensic and mal-
ware samples. Even generic desktop workstations contain
object code for architectures other than the main CPU.
These can include GPU-enabled programs, firmware for
network cards and other devices which contain embedded
CPUs (Blanco and Eissler [2012], Delugre´ [2010]), man-
agement co-processors (Miller [2011]), and USB drivers
for devices that contain their own processors for services
like data compression or encryption. The object code for
these devices is often stored in files with non-standard
headers or embedded inside driver object files. Analysts
are seeking tools to jump-start the analysis process by au-
tomatically labeling unknown samples.
Plenty of recent research has shown that raw byte fre-
quency analysis can be used to classify files and file frag-
ments. These analyses fall short in two areas when ap-
plied to object code. First, by taking the entire sample into
consideration, they include file meta-data into their anal-
ysis. In many cases this is beneficial, but there are a few
cases where this might be a concern. For example, the
sample itself may be incomplete (a partial forensic disk
recovery or a partial packet capture), not trustworthy (de-
liberate obfuscation bymalware), or simply have no meta-
data (firmware, reverse engineering, raw instruction traces
from virtual machines). Ideally analysts want a classifier
that relies solely on the object code itself, ignoring any
meta-data that may (or may not) be present. Secondly, the
analysis from most previous work stops one level above
what we believe is possible. These systems will identify
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a sample as containing object code, but won’t give any
more information than a general file label. When possi-
ble, we should label the sample with information about
the type of object code the sample contains.
We propose methods that apply machine learning tech-
niques to automatically classify an object code sample
with its target architecture and endianess. Such a system
automates the first phase of object code analysis, allowing
the analyst to jump directly to decoding the instructions
and determining intent.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: The next
sub-section discusses related research. In the Hypothesis
section we attempt to formalize the problem of architec-
ture and endianess classification. Next we discusses the
intuition behind our proposed solutions, and then go over
our experimental design and results. We conclude with a
discussion of the results and potential follow-on work.
1.1 Related Research
Many systems exist to determine the type of binary code
a file may contain. The simplest systems rely solely on
the file name or file extension. However, most systems
rely on the contents of a “file header” at a known location
within the file (normally at the beginning) which includes
metadata about what type of file it is, such as a document,
picture, or executable. The UNIX file command uses a
database of “magic” values at known offsets within the
file to classify the file type. In the case of executables or
other object code, these file type (ELF, PE, etc.) headers
contain fields with information such as the target archi-
tecture, word size, and endianess. Each of these systems
uses some form of meta-data (file header, signature, or
filename) that may not be available to an analyst.
McDaniel and Heydari [2003] were among the first to
propose using characteristics derived from the contents of
an entire file to do classification. They used byte-value
histograms as one of their representations and performed
statistical analysis to classify files. This inspired many
more researchers to use other methods including n-gram
analysis and SVMs to tackle the same problem. Examples
include Fitzgerald et al. [2012], Li et al. [2010], Li et al.
[2005], and Xie et al. [2013]. Beebe et al. [2013] pro-
duced the Sceadan tool which builds upon much of this
earlier work. This line of research has concentrated on
differentiating diverse file types from each other.
Relating specifically to architecture classification,
Chernov and Troshina [2012] attempt to automate the
analysis of custom virtual machines used by malware.
Their system uses opcode frequency counts as part of their
analysis system to help defeat code obfuscation within the
custom virtual machine. Similarly, Rad et al. [2012] show
that opcode frequency code counts can be used to find mu-
tated forms of the same malware. They rely on knowledge
of the underlying physical system’s opcodes as an indica-
tor of program similarity.
Sickendick [2013] describes a system for firmware dis-
assembly including file carving and architecture detec-
tion using machine learning. For architecture detection,
he adapts the method Kolter and Maloof [2006], used for
malware detection. The information gain for each byte
value 4-gram in the training set is calculated, and the top
500 4-grams are used as a feature vector for a Decision-
Tree and an SVM classifier. This work is limited to four
architectures common to SCADA devices and makes no
attempt to classify different endianess with the same ar-
chitecture.
Binwalk (Heffner [2010]) is a popular firmware anal-
ysis tool that includes two techniques to identify object
code. When run with the ’-A’ option, Binwalk looks for
architecture specific signatures indicative of object code.
Currently, Binwalk’s architecture signature detection in-
cludes 33 signatures from 9 different architectures. How-
ever, Binwalk simply reports every place it finds a signa-
ture and leaves it up to the user to make a classification
decision based upon that information. Binwalk also in-
cludes a ’-Y’ option which will attempt to disassemble
code fragments using the Capstone (Anh [2014]) disas-
sembly framework configured for multiple architectures.
Binwalk currently supports 9 configurations of 4 unique
architectures for disassembly. Notably, both methods can
potentially indicate endianess as well as architecture.
Binwalk’s methods are effective in a wide variety of
use cases, but are not without their limitations. Signa-
ture based methods can lead to false positives if the byte
signatures are not unique when compared to other archi-
tectures. Evidence of such collisions exists in the Binwalk
code itself, where a comment mentions that some 16-bit
MIPS code signatures are often detected in ARM Thumb
code. Disassembly of a fragment can also cause issues.
There is at least one case (i386 versus x86 64) where
both architectures could disassemble the same fragment
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of code without error. Both techniques rely on previous
knowledge of the architecture, and in the case of active
disassembly, complete knowledge and support in a disas-
sembler framework. The technique presented in this pa-
per takes a more holistic approach, and is able to classify
architectures, both virtual and physical, for which there
are samples, even if information about the architecture is
incomplete.
2 Problem
We aim to automatically classify two characteristics of
computer object code:
• Architecture: The unique encoding of the computer’s
instructions.
• Endianess: The way the code expectsmulti-byte data
to be ordered when in memory.
Computer object code consists of a stream of machine
instructions encoded as a string of bytes. The instruction
stream is loaded into memory and stored in the native en-
dianess of the processor. The processor fetches instruc-
tions from the instruction stream in memory, and then
decodes and executes them. Computers share the same
architecture if they use the same (or similar) encodings
for these machine instructions. The encoding of the in-
structions is referred to as an instruction set. Some archi-
tectures define fixed-length instruction encodings while
others define variable-length instruction encodings. This
makes it impossible to determine the boundaries of in-
structions within an instruction stream without knowing
the target architecture.
Machine instructions consist of two parts: the opcode
specifies which instruction the processor is to execute, and
operands which specify what data (or pointers to data)
that the instruction applies to. Opcodes are the byte repre-
sentation of the instruction and are specified by the archi-
tecture. Operands can be many things including encoded
register values, memory locations, and direct data values.
While opcode encodings are unique to a specific architec-
ture, operands vary with the data and flow of the particu-
lar program. To accurately classify the architecture, one
should isolate its opcodes.
Endianess refers to the way the architecture stores
multi-byte data in memory. There are two ways multi-
byte values may be encoded: least significant byte first
(little endian) or most significant byte first (big endian).1
Most architectures define an endianess, so knowing the
architecture automatically infers the endianess. However,
some architectures (e.g. MIPS, ARM, Power) can be
configured to use either endianess at runtime, and thus
a proper classification must also determine the endianess
of a sample for those architectures.
Since endianess deals with the layout of data in mem-
ory, it is difficult to determine from a sample of object
code alone. However, operands may contain immediate
values and/or address values which are encoded in the na-
tive endianess of the architecture when stored in memory
or on disk. Any system that classifies endianess from an
instruction stream may be able to extract that information
from the portion of the object code used for operands.
3 Hypothesis
Previous research (McDaniel and Heydari [2003]) has
shown that byte-value histograms over an entire file can
be useful when classifying a file’s type. We propose to
apply this same basic technique to the object code em-
bedded within a sample. We deliberately ignore the rest
of the file as it may contain meta-data that is either not
present or not trustworthy within a given scenario.
Examples from some known architecture encodings
gives us reason to believe that a byte-value histogram will
be useful for classification. The ‘amd64’ architecture is
a 64-bit extension of the ‘i386’ architecture, and uses a
special “prefix” byte for every instruction that uses 64-
bit operands. This byte has the high 4-bit nibble set to
b‘0100’ and the lower four bits change depending on the
rest of the instruction. One would expect a byte-value his-
togram for a sample from the amd64 architecture to con-
tain many values that start with ‘0x4’. ARM instruction
encoding specifies the upper 4 bits of each instruction start
with ‘condition codes’. For most instructions, these are
set to b‘1110’, which means ‘always execute’. Therefore,
one would expect that a byte-value histogram for ARM
1There is also “mixed endian”, but that is no longer in wide use and
not considered for this analysis.
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systems to contain many values that start with ‘0xE’. In-
tuitively, a machine learning algorithm should be able to
accurately classify between these two architectures based
solely on a byte-value histogram.
More generally, in order for a byte-value histogram to
be useful for classifying object code, the uniqueness of
the architecture’s opcodes must be preserved within the
histogram. To demonstrate this is possible, we need an
estimation of how likely an opcode is to influence each
byte within the code section. We call this the opcode den-
sity of the architecture, and it is calculated by the formula:
Opcode Density =
length of opcode
average instruction length
For fixed-length instruction set architectures, the in-
struction length is fixed (normally 32 or 64 bits depending
on the architecture’s word size), and the opcode takes up
between 6 and 12 bits, depending on the instruction. To
use MIPS as an example, the instruction length is 4 bytes,
and the opcode is 6 bits long, for an opcode density of ap-
proximately 19%. Practically, this means the first byte of
every instruction (one in four bytes) will have the opcode
encoded in its top 6 bits, heavily influencing its value.
Similar analysis can be carried out using the SPARC and
Alpha architectures, where the opcode is encoded in 8
bits, and ARM (8-bit opcodes + 4-bit condition codes).
Even if we assume that the operands in the object code are
random values, one can see that for fixed length instruc-
tion encodings one in four byte-values within the object
code will be heavily influenced by the opcode value.
For variable length instruction sets the analysis is more
difficult, as we no longer know the ratio of opcodes to to-
tal instruction length. Intel i386 opcodes have a minimum
length of one byte (but can be two or more). Blem et al.
[2013] show that on average, the i386 architecture for
general desktop workloads has an instruction length of
3.4 bytes. This means that even if we assume one-byte
opcodes, our opcode density is approximately 30%, or at
the very least it is higher than most fixed-length instruc-
tion encodings for a typical workload.
These rough calculations give us some confidence that
a byte-value histogram can preserve information about the
opcode encoding, and thus can be used for architecture
classification.
3.1 Endianess
Unfortunately, determining endianess is impossible with
a byte-value histogram alone. Determining endianess re-
quires byte adjacency information, and adjacency infor-
mation is lost in the conversion to the histogram. There-
fore, in order to determine endianess, we need another set
of features that can preserve byte ordering information.
One approach would be to generate a 2-byte-value (bi-
gram) histogram. While this may encode adjacency in-
formation, it would explode our feature space from 256
dimensions to 65536, adding a large amount of computa-
tional complexity. Also, despite the intuition, our experi-
ments show that this approach is not useful for determin-
ing endianess.
In the previous analysis we treated the operands for a
sample as random noise. While convenient for that anal-
ysis, at least some instructions encode ‘immediate’ data
within their operands. These operands are stored in the
object code in native-endian format. We aim to exploit
this information to determine endianess using a small set
of heuristics.
On machines without an increment instruction, one
common operation when incrementing by a small value
is to use an add instruction with an immediate operand
of 1. On big endian machines, one is encoded in 32 bit as
0x00000001,while on little endian machines it is encoded
as 0x01000000. This provides us with a heuristic: if we
scan the object code for the 2-byte strings ‘0x0100’ and
‘0x0001’, then the latter should occur more often in little
endian samples and the former should occur more often
in big endian samples. This could be repeated for other
small values. Another common immediate value encoded
in operands are addresses. Some addresses, typically for
stack values, are high up in the address space and start
with values like 0xfffe. Again, these addresses are stored
differently on big endian versus little endian machines,
and a scan for both values 0xfffe and 0xfeff can be used
as another indicator of endianess.
We propose to use these four heuris-
tically derived 2-byte frequency counts
(‘0xfffe’,‘0xfeff’,‘0x0001’,‘0x0100’) as four new
“endian” features to augment the byte-value histogram,
as shown in Figure 1. We demonstrate that these fea-
tures add the ability to predict endianess with minimal
computational overhead.
4
Figure 1: Layout of the full 260-dimension feature vector.
4 Experiments
We tested the theory that our features are sufficient to clas-
sify architecture and endianess by creating a dataset of
sample object code, generating the representative feature
vectors, and then training machine learning models using
our features.
4.1 Dataset
The Linux operating system has been ported to many
different architectures since its inception, and provides
a rich starting point for our dataset. A typical distribu-
tion installs anywhere from 600 to 1300 files that contain
compiled object code for the supported architectures. A
large number of our samples come from the Debian Linux
distribution for different architectures. To augment the
dataset beyondwhat is available within Linux systems, we
collected samples of Arduino code that targets the AVR
line of 8-bit micro-controllers as well as CUDA samples
that target the nVidia line of GPUs. All sample files in this
data set are ELF files, and object code identified by using
the PyBDF (Russ and Muniz [2013]) library to parse ELF
section information.
A summary of the resulting dataset with samples from
20 different architectures is shown in Table 1. Of par-
ticular interest to endianess classification is the inclusion
of ‘mips’ and ‘mipsel’ as two different classes. As both
classes use the exact same opcodes, the only difference
between the samples is the endianess of values within
their operands.
As with all datasets, this one could be improved. All
samples except the CUDA samples are compiled with
GCC. A different compiler might use a different mix of
opcodes and thus have a different signature. Additionally,
there are many more 8 and 16-bit architectures than what
are represented here. We hope to augment this dataset
over time to add more diversity among the samples.
Architecture # Samples Wordsize Endianess
alpha 1,383 64-bit Big
hppa 625 32-bit Big
m68k 1,296 32-bit Big
arm64 1,134 64-bit Little
ppc64 823 64-bit Big
sh4 822 32-bit Little
sparc64 752 64-bit Big
amd64 965 64-bit Little
armel 960 32-bit Little
armhf 960 32-bit Little
i386 967 32-bit Little
ia64 650 64-bit Little
mips 960 32-bit Big
mipsel 960 32-bit Little
powerpc 992 32-bit Big
s390 649 32-bit Big
s390x 653 64-bit Big
sparc 648 32-bit Big
cuda 17 32-bit Little
avr 596 8-bit Little
Total 16,785
Table 1: Dataset statistics for all 20 architectures. Note
that these reflect the samples that are in the dataset, not
the full capabilities of the architecture. For example, there
can be HPPA systems that are 64-bit, and ARM, MIPS,
and PowerPC can all be configured as either little endian
or big endian.
4.2 Feature Generation
As described above, we will use a feature vector that
contains a byte-value histogram of the code section aug-
mented with four additional counts of specific values we
will look for to indicate endianess. The layout of the fea-
ture vector is shown in Figure 1.
When preparing the samples, we can choose to have
one feature vector per sample file, or we can choose to
extract the code from each file into one big pool and
draw equal-sized samples from the global pool. The lat-
ter approach might be beneficial to avoid an issue where
an individual file’s code sections are tiny, and thus has
mostly zero values in its histogram. However, the ap-
proach of one-sample-per-file is a more realistic scenario
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in the field. For this paper, one feature vector is generated
per sample file.
The byte-value histogram is generated by scanning ev-
ery sample file for all sections labeled as executable code,
and then reading those sections one byte at a time to gen-
erate our byte-value histogram. When the entire file has
been processed, the histogram values are normalized by
dividing each value by the number of bytes of code within
that file. These make up the first 256 entries in the feature
vector. The four additional endianess values are calcu-
lated by a linear scan of each code section for the specific
two-byte values. These counts are normalized over the
size of the code sections within the file as well. All parts
of the file that do not contain object code, as defined by
the ELF section’s CODE flag (or, in the case of CUDA
code, an ELF section named .nv fatbin), are explicitly ex-
cluded from the feature vectors.
In addition to generating samples that use the entire
code section within the sample file, we also want to test
against object code fragments of varying size. To gener-
ate those feature vectors, the same procedure is followed
except that the byte values are taken as a random sam-
pling of the code bytes up to the desired size (or the end
of the code section). Random sampling removes any bias
that may present itself by continuously using the begin-
ning of each code section. For these feature vectors, the
endian feature counts are also generated using random 2-
byte sampling of N offsets within the code section, where
N is the maximum size of the sample. The appropriate
feature count is incremented if the random 2-byte sample
matches one of the specific 2-byte values we’re searching
for. These counts are also normalized to the number of
code bytes used within the sample.
To test the effectiveness of 2-byte bi-grams, we gener-
ate 64k-entry feature vectors for the ‘mips’, and ‘mipsel’
classes. We can then compare the results when using this
data subset to the overall results using our four endian fea-
tures.
5 Results
We used the generated feature vectors to train a set
of common multi-class classifiers available in WEKA
(Hall et al. [2009]). The models chosen are inherently
multi-class, with the exception of the SVM (SMO) model
which uses a series of 1-versus-1 comparisons to choose
the final class. The results are summarized in Table 2
which shows the 10-fold stratified cross validation accu-
racy for the chosen classifiers. Of note, the linear-based
classifiers (Logistic Regression, SVM) and the Decision
Tree seem to have the greatest accuracy, but all classi-
fiers do very well. This clearly shows that there is enough
unique information about the architecture exposed within
the byte histogram to accurately classify object code in
nearly all instances.
Table 3 shows the F-Measure values broken down by
class for the Logistic Regression classifier. F-Measure is
the harmonic mean of Precision and Recall. Higher F-
Measure values indicate better classification performance,
and a value of 1.0 would be perfect classification. The
chart shows that the majority of the classification errors
are caused in the ‘mips’ and ‘mipsel’ classes when we
do not include our four endianess features and rely solely
on the byte histogram. The dramatic improvement in F-
Measure with these features shows that they are indeed
useful heuristics for determining endianess. Note that
CUDA F-Measure scores suffer from the small number
of CUDA samples available within the dataset.
These classifiers are mostly trained with their default
parameters. One notable exception to this is the Neural
Network classifier, which suffers from overfitting when
adding the endian features with the default network struc-
ture of 260x140x20. A partial grid search over the number
of epochs and the number of hidden nodes suggest a net-
work configuration of 260x66x20with 100 epochs results
in performance in line with the other classifiers. See Table
5 for the full breakdown of all parameters used to gener-
ate these results. Parameters for each classifier could un-
doubtedly be tuned further for even greater classification
performance.
Finally, Table 4 shows the F-Measure of two models
classifying ‘mips’ versus ‘mipsel’ using a 64k bi-gram
histogram versus our 260 feature byte histogram and en-
dian features. Surprisingly, the bi-gram encoding appears
to preservemuch less endian information than our simpler
heuristic-based method despite the much higher computa-
tional overhead of its larger feature vector.
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5.1 Sample Size
The above results achieve high accuracy using the every
byte of object code available within each sample. Another
question is how large of a sample fragment do you need
to achieve high accuracy. This is a useful metric for an-
alysts who often deal with incomplete fragments of sam-
ples. To test this, we generate new feature vectors from
our samples using maximum sample sizes of four bytes up
to one megabyte using the random sample methodology
explained earlier. We then ran each of these size-based
feature sets through the models trained on the full-sample
instances. The results are summarized in Figure 2. These
results show that for both the SVM and 1-NN classifiers,
one can achieve very high accuracy even for tiny amounts
of sample data, and that by 8KB, nearly all classifiers are
above 90% accuracy.
6 Discussion and Further Work
We have shown that machine learning can be an effec-
tive tool to classify the target architecture of object code.
As this method is independent of potentially misleading
meta-data, it provides both a way to verify existing meta-
data and a way forward when no meta-data is present.
We have developed heuristics that can be used to predict
the endianess of code. Of the classifiers tested, SVM and
nearest neighbor approaches appear to provide good clas-
sification performance regardless of fragment size.
Going forward, we would like to expand our current
architecture dataset to include a more varied sampling of
architectures. We intend to include more embedded plat-
forms, microcontroller code, and more GPU samples. We
will also include samples using different compilers than
GCC, including LLVM/Clang and Microsoft Visual Stu-
dio, to make sure that different code generation engines
do not effect the overall classification performance.
In addition to expanding the dataset, we will continue
to explore other areas to apply machine learning to bi-
nary object code. Two interesting areas of research in-
clude code attribution, and automated reverse engineering
techniques such as determining function boundaries. We
feel that machine learning could play an important role in
advancing these research areas.
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Trained Model WEKA Name Parameters
1-NN IBk -K 1 -W 0 -A "weka.core.neighboursearch.-
LinearNNSearch -A "weka.core.-
EuclideanDistance -R first-last""
3-NN IBk -K 3 -W 0 -A "weka.core.neighboursearch.-
LinearNNSearch -A "weka.core.-
EuclideanDistance -R first-last""
Decision Tree J48 -C 0.25 -M 2
Random Tree RandomTree -K 0 -M 1.0 -V 0.001 -S 1
Random Forest RandomForest -I 100 -K 0 -S 1 -num-slots 1
Naive Bayes NaiveBayes N/A
BayesNet BayesNet -D -Q weka.classifiers.bayes.net.-
search.local.K2 -- -P 1 -S BAYES
-E weka.classifiers.bayes.net.-
estimate.SimpleEstimator -- -A 0.5
SVM (SMO) SMO -C 1.0 -L 0.001 -P 1.0E-12 -N 0 -V -1
-W 1 -K "weka.classifiers.functions.-
supportVector.PolyKernel -E 1.0 -C 250007"
Logistic Regression SimpleLogistic -I 0 -M 500 -H 50 -W 0.0
Neural Net MultilayerPerceptron -L 0.3 -M 0.2 -N 100 -V 0 -S 0 -E 20 -H 66
Table 5: Full parameter list used for training each WEKA model. Deviations from the default values are marked in
bold.
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